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Abstract. Alongside the intensive growth of Online Social Networks
(OSNs), privacy has become an important concept and requirement when
sharing content online, leading users to enforce privacy often using en-
cryption when sharing content with multiple recipients. Although cryp-
tographic systems achieve common privacy goals such as confidentiality,
key privacy, and recipient privacy, they have not been designed aiming at
dynamic types of networks. In fact, the interactive nature of OSNs pro-
vides adversaries new attack vectors against privacy, and in particular
against recipient privacy. We present the notion of frientropy, and argue
that privacy of recipients is maintained in OSNs provided that the social
graph has a high frientropy, besides the conventional recipient privacy
notion. We compute the frientropy for various theoretical settings, and
discuss its implications on some practical settings.
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1 Introduction
In today’s networked and interactive world privacy has become a focal point
of research, and it is debated over several disciplines, such as law, philosophy,
technology, and cryptography. Privacy-enhancing technologies have been devel-
oped and both lauded and critiqued by experts, politicians, and other interested
parties. Although finding a suitable definition for privacy is a very hard task,
in modern cryptography the requirement of privacy is resumed to provable se-
curity and privacy definitions. In general, notions such as k-anonymity [16] and
anonymity sets [14] have been used to make explicit mathematical formulations
on anonymity. In the public key cryptography setting, Bellare et al. defined the
notion of public key anonymity as key privacy [6], so that an adversary cannot
distinguish which key was used for the encryption and thus cannot identify the
user from the ciphertext. Later, Barth et al. [2] extended this notion for the
multiple user setting by recipient privacy, such that to achieve privacy of the
recipients on broadcast encryption, the adversary cannot distinguish the identi-
ties in the authorized recipient set. The concept has been generalized by Libert
et al. [13], and relaxed by Fazio et al. [11] with the outsider recipient privacy
notion, towards outsiders and not against authorized users, i.e., insiders.
At the same time, with the enormous growth of interactive services such as
Online Social Networks (OSNs), different privacy paradigms have been intro-
duced, allowing users to share content with multiple entities which may interact
with replies, likes, and comments. Yet, the above notions of recipient privacy
have not been designed for dynamic systems, and become void and difficult to
maintain, as each reply gives away the identity of at least one of the recipi-
ents, and subsequently compromises the privacy of the whole recipient set in the
adversarial model. In fact, current definitions are designed for scenarios where
the data is conveyed through some content distribution system and accessed by
different users, and not published on interactive centralized platforms suscep-
tible to single replies revealing the users in the set. Hence, current definitions
assume that adversaries are not able to gain information of the set by observing
interactions in the communications within the set, which is unrealistic for OSNs.
In this paper, we take a look at the problem of recipient privacy when applied
to interactive platforms, used in cases where the aim of the cryptographic scheme
is to enable anonymous and confidential communications between several entities
over a potentially malicious platform with interactive properties, such as OSNs.
This notion has been used by practical tools, such as Scramble! [5], aiming at
protecting the privacy and secrecy of the content shared in OSNs [3, 4]. We begin
by demonstrating the shortcomings (Section 3) of the existing recipient privacy
definitions when applied to interactive platforms such as OSNs, as the security
and privacy assumptions as well as the proofs of previous constructions can
be broken in a straightforward fashion. Hence, in order to re-define the notion
of recipient privacy with interactive properties we introduce the novel notion
of frientropy (Section 4), apply it to complete and threshold sets of recipients
and discuss the practical impact of frientropy (Section 5). Then we present a
new interactive recipient privacy definition along with the notion of membership
queries (Section 6). We argue that the new notion presents a more suitable
definition when applied to interactive platforms and that solely the encryption of
the message content does not suffice to provide privacy of recipients of messages
against realistic adversaries in the OSN setting. Finally, we discuss our results
in the new setting and conclude with future research topics.
2 Private Broadcast Encryption
For any n ∈ N, let {0, 1}n denote the set of bit strings of length n, and {0, 1}∗ the
set of bit strings of arbitrary length. For two strings x and y, x ‖ y denotes their
concatenation and x⊕ y their bitwise XOR. The notation x $←− X indicates that
x is selected uniformly at random from the finite set X and x
X←− X that x is
selected from X according to some arbitrary probability distribution X over X.
For any two sets X and Y , we define the union by X ∪Y = {z : z ∈ X ∨ z ∈ Y },
the intersection as X ∩ Y = {z : z ∈ X ∧ z ∈ Y }, and the empty set by ∅.
In broadcast encryption, a sender broadcasts an encrypted message to mul-
tiple people, so that only a pre-selected set S ⊆ U is able to decrypt, where U
is the universe (e.g., the set of all people being active on an OSN). The goal
of private broadcast encryption is to keep the pre-selected set of recipients S
private, such that from the ciphertext it should be impossible to infer anything
about the intended recipients. The security of private broadcast encryption is
conventionally split into key privacy and recipient privacy.
Public key anonymity, or key privacy, was defined by Bellare et al. [6] as the
indistinguishability property of the public keys used for encryption.
Definition 1 (Key Privacy, Bellare et al. [6]). A public key encryption
scheme C← Encpk(m), is key private if any bounded adversary A, with access to
the list of public keys {pk1,. . . ,pkn}, is not able to distinguish the output Cb of
Encpkb(m) when using some pkx and pky, s.t., b ∈ {x, y} and x, y ∈ {1, . . . , n},
with non-negligible probability:
|Pr[A(pkx, pky, m, Cx) = 1]− Pr[A(pkx, pky, m, Cy) = 1]| ≤ .
Recipient privacy was defined by Barth et al. [2], and defines for any two recipient
sets S0 and S1 the hardness for an A to distinguish between a ciphertext for the
recipient set S0, and S1, given that |S0| = |S1| and that A does not possess the
secret keys of any users in U\(S0∩S1). A generalization to anonymous broadcast
encryption (and where the challenge message may be different for both sets, if
|S0 ∩ S1| = 0) is given by Libert et al. [13].
Definition 2 (Recipient Privacy, Barth et al. [2]). A broadcast encryption
scheme Π ← {Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt} provides recipient privacy if
a PPT adversary A wins the following game with the challenger Ch, only with
negligible probability:
Init: Ch runs params← Setup(λ), and gives A the resulting params. A outputs
S0,S1 ⊆ U , such that |S0| = |S1|.
Setup: Ch generates keys (pki , ski)← KeyGen(params, i) for each recipient i ∈
U , and sends pki for each i ∈ U and ski for each i ∈ S0 ∩ S1 to A.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues decryption queries q1 = (C, i) for any i ∈ U , and
Ch returns Decrypt(params, ski , C).
Challenge: A gives Ch a message m. The Ch picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
runs C′ ← Encrypt(params, {i|i ∈ Sb}, m), and sends C′ to A.
Phase 2: A adaptively issues decryption queries q2 = (C, i), s.t., C 6= C′.
Guess: A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary wins if b = b′, and we define AdvRecPrivA =
∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12 ∣∣.
3 Practical Shortcomings of Recipient Privacy
The common definition of recipient privacy was designed to protect the identities
of the recipients in content sharing systems, such as shared filesystems. Nowa-
days, OSNs have become very popular media for sharing content and distributing
information. One key element of the OSNs is that they collect and process all
the data that the users post on the OSN, thus OSNs cannot be considered a
trusted third party in the communications and should be incorporated into the
adversarial model. Hence, posting information encrypted to enhance privacy is a
valid strategy and can be done, for example, with the help of Scramble! [5]. How-
ever, the above notion of recipient privacy does not stand against the OSN and
the dynamic nature of the OSNs. Let Π ← {Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt}
be a recipient private broadcast encryption scheme and S and S ′ be two sets of
identities with |S| = |S ′| with corresponding (sets of) keys. Now, the encryption
of some message m is done with either of these sets and the adversary needs to
distinguish between EncryptS(m) and EncryptS′(m). Recipient privacy guaran-
tees that the adversary has only a negligible probability for achieving this by
performing decryption queries to chosen ciphertexts. However, if the adversary
is able to observe subsequent transactions between the communicating parties in
the communications channel or OSN, e.g., likes or comments, the adversary can
easily break the privacy of the recipients under the recipient privacy definition.
For example, if the adversary chooses two sets of recipients such that S∩S ′ =
∅, then a single like, comment or reply to the message compromises the recipient
privacy property for the whole set of recipients. That is, a single person in the set
can (inadvertently) compromise the privacy for the whole set. If the user u ∈ S
comments on the message, the adversary can see this and knows immediately
which set (S or S’) was used to encrypt and thus also the identities of the
remaining members of the set. This type of observation is usually not even
limited to the OSN provider, but can be done also by other members of the
OSN or even publicly, e.g., Twitter. Thus the notion of recipient privacy can
lead to a false sense of privacy in OSNs, where at least the OSN and quite
possibly also other potential adversaries can observe such interactions.
In fact, even if S∩S ′ 6= ∅ and even if there are more than two sets from which
the adversary needs to distinguish, any comment from a person that is member
of only a single set breaks recipient privacy for the other members of the set.
Even if the revealed identity is included in many different sets, those sets that
the identity is not in can be excluded as possibilities and thus distinguishing
becomes easier for the adversary. After a few comments from different identities,
the adversary can probably make a good guess on the set of recipients. Avoiding
statistical inference from the pattern of communications is very difficult and
the very facts that there a) exists a lot of interaction between people in social
networks, and b) this interaction is usually observable, make recipient privacy
fairly hard to accomplish in real systems.
It is also worth noting that even strong schemes, such as the ones presented
in [12], cannot protect against this type of inference. The anonymity and unlink-
ability properties shown in [12] protect against an adversary that gains access
to the credentials, but not against an adversary that observes interaction be-
tween the profile content and possible recipients. Thus, the adversary can use
statistical inference on the social graph to attack the privacy of users.
Furthermore, it can be argued that even in the original intended use cases of
content distribution systems, there are many ways in which the adversary could
learn the actual recipients of the broadcast messages. The adversary could gain
access to the system logs that may contain information on who has gotten hold
of the message and whether or not they have been successful in decrypting it. Of
course, this requires much more effort than in the OSN setting, but ultimately it
leads to the same situation that the adversary learns some members of the recip-
ient set and can try to infer the others from social graphs such as organizational
charts, and others.
More generally, encrypting the content of the replies and comments does not
protect against this type of privacy attack. As the observation is based on the
metadata (i.e. who is communicating with whom etc.) of the communications,
the adversary does not need access to the actual content. On the other hand,
this attack does not reveal anything about the content of the messages either,
so the secrecy of the content is protected even if the privacy of the recipients
is violated. Consequently, these observations do not highlight issues in the con-
ventional security definitions (such as the one on recipient privacy), but rather,
identify a need for a formalism of the amount of entropy provided by the set of
recipients. We will address this issue in the following sections.
4 Frientropy
To take into account the interactive nature of OSNs as content sharing platforms,
we argue that an additional security property is needed on top of traditional
recipient privacy. At a high level, this security property, which we dub frientropy,
captures the case that your pool of friends has a sufficiently high level of entropy.
We first need a definition of (conditional) min-entropy [1].
Definition 3 ((Conditional) Min-Entropy). Let X be a random variable.
The min-entropy of X is defined as H∞(X) = − log2(maxx Pr[X = x]). We de-
fine the conditional min-entropy of X based on Y as H∞(X | Y ) = − log2(maxx Pr[X =
x | Y ]), where log2(0) := −∞ and H∞(X | false) :=∞ by default.
We are now ready to define “frientropy.” Recall that U defines the universe.
Denote its power set by P(U), and let B ⊆ P(U) \ {∅} be a set of subsets of U
such that ∅ /∈ B. For i = 1, . . . , |U|, write Bi ⊆ B to be the set of subsets of
size exactly i. Frientropy informally captures the amount of randomness a set of
subsets B offers even if some users disclosed themselves. Note that, in practical
settings, B corresponds to all possible friend groups in an OSN. As such, the sets
of recipients are heavily dependent on the communication patterns and social
graphs of users. The randomness of a set B ∈ B to appear will be captured by
an arbitrary probability distribution X .
Definition 4 (Frientropy). Let X be a probability distribution over the power
set of B. Let 0 ≤ κ ≤ |U|, and let R ⊆ U be a set of size |R| = κ. Let
Φ = (Φ1, . . . , Φ|U|) ≥ (0, . . . , 0). The set B has κ-frientropy Φ if for each i =
1, . . . , |U|,
H∞(B | R ⊆ B) ≥ Φi , (1)
where B X←− Bi.
The definition is intuitively captured as follows: we consider the case where R is
a set of users that revealed themselves as being part of a certain unknown set,
and the frientropy of B than captures the amount of randomness offered by all
sets that include R. Note that a separation of the frientropy into the different
sizes of the sets in B makes sense, given that in broadcast encryption the size of
the set of recipients is known.
One should also note that frientropy is of a dual nature to the measures of
anonymity presented by Diaz et al. [9] and extended by Serjantov and Danezis
[15] and To´th et al. [17]. These measures are centered around the anonymity of
a sender or (usually a single) recipient of a message in some mix network that
tries to hide the identity of the senders and recipients from observers and provide
a metric for the anonymity of recipients. Frientropy provides a metric for the
people associated with some known recipients of a message and is thus different
from the previous measures.
4.1 Frientropy for Complete Sets
As a simple example, we will compute the frientropy in case B is a complete set,
and the probability distribution is the uniform distribution: B $←− B.
Proposition 1. Consider B = P(U) \ {∅} to be the set of all non-empty subsets
of U , and let X be the uniform distribution. Let 0 ≤ κ ≤ |U|. The set B has
κ-frientropy Φ = (Φ1, . . . , Φ|U|), where
Φi =
{∞ if 1 ≤ i < κ ,
log2
((|U|−κ
i−κ
))
if i ≥ κ .
Proof. Let R ⊆ U be a set of size |R| = κ. Note that if i < κ, then R ⊆ B
cannot be satisfied as B $←− Bi, and we have H∞(B | false) = ∞ by default. For
i ≥ κ, it is an easy exercise to see that
H∞(B | R ⊆ B) = − log2(max
b∈Bi
Pr[B = b | R ⊆ B]) = − log2
(
1
|{B ∈ Bi | R ⊆ B}|
)
= log2 (|{B ∈ Bi | R ⊆ B}|) = log2
((|U| − κ
i− κ
))
=: Φi ,
as R fixes κ elements in B, and the remaining i− κ elements can be any of the
|U| − κ remaining values in U . uunionsq
The result reminds of the celebrated Erdo¨s-Ko-Rado (EKR) theorem [10]. At a
high-level, this theorem centers around the problem of determining maximum
families B of λ-subsets of a set U such that any two sets have at least µ elements
in common, and shows that |B| ≤ (|U|−µλ−µ ) for large enough U . Various variants
of the EKR theorem have appeared, all differing in the conditions put on the set
(see [8, 7] for a discussion). However, the seemingly apparent connection between
the EKR theorem and Prop. 1 is merely coincidence, as in our case we focus on
the (much simpler) problem of determining the number of sets B with R ⊆ B for
a given R. Further, while the EKR theorem targets the derivation of an upper
bound, we are effectively aiming for strong lower bounds on the size of B.
4.2 Frientropy for Threshold Sets
A practically more interesting case is where B ⊆ P(U) \ {∅} is incomplete, in
which case the frientropy will naturally decrease. Indeed, if a user u ∈ U appears
in exactly one set in B ∈ B, then B has 1-frientropy Φ|B| = 0, which can be
seen by taking R = {u}. This leads to the definition of appearance in and the
threshold of B.
Definition 5. Let B ⊆ P(U) \ {∅}. For a u ∈ U , define its appearance in B by
appearB(u) = |{B ∈ B | u ∈ B}|. Define the threshold of B as
τB := min
u∈U,
appearB(u)>0
appearB(u) . (2)
Informally, the appearance of u in B is the number of sets in B that include u,
and the threshold of B determines the minimal non-trivial appearance of any u.
We are now ready to derive the following result.
Proposition 2. Consider any B ⊆ P(U) \ {∅}, and let X be the uniform distri-
bution. Let 0 ≤ κ ≤ |U|. The set B has κ-frientropy Φ = (Φ1, . . . , Φ|U|), where
Φi =
{
∞ if 1 ≤ i < κ ,
log2 (max{1, |Bi| − (|Bi| − τBi)κ}) if i ≥ κ .
Proof. Let R ⊆ U be a set of size |R| = κ. The case i < κ is as in Prop. 1. For
i ≥ κ, we can similarly compute
H∞(B | R ⊆ B) = − log2(max
b∈Bi
Pr[B = b | R ⊆ B]) = log2 (|{B ∈ Bi | R ⊆ B}|) ,
provided |{B ∈ Bi | R ⊆ B}| > 0. (Note that if this set were of size 0, we would
necessarily have R 6⊆ B and thus H∞(B | false) = ∞. We could henceforth
discard this case.) This leaves us at the problem of determining a lower bound
for the following problem: given κ elements R, each of which appears in at least
τBi sets B ∈ Bi, what is the number of sets B ∈ Bi that include all elements from
R? A simple pigeonhole-principle-like computation shows that
|{B ∈ Bi | R ⊆ B}| ≥ |Bi| − (|Bi| − τBi)κ ,
as every of the κ elements in R eliminates at most |Bi| − τBi sets in Bi. Along
with above-mentioned non-emptyness assumption on this set, we can put
Φi := log2 (max{1, |Bi| − (|Bi| − τBi)κ})
as stated. uunionsq
A simple sanity check shows that if B is complete, the quantity in the log2-term
of Prop. 2 reads |Bi|−(|Bi|−τBi)κ =
(|U|
i
)−((|U|i )− (|U|−1i−1 ))κ, which is slightly
worse than
(|U|−κ
i−κ
)
of Prop. 1.
5 Frientropy in Practice
In [2] it is suggested that making the set S always of fixed size using dummy
identities could provide some added security against privacy violations. This
would mean that if the average size of the recipient set is some n ∈ N, then
during encryption the set S would be filled up to n with dummy identities or
S would be divided into separate sets of size n and the last one would be filled
with dummies. The suggestion is supported by Prop. 2, as it shows that the
frientropy increases if for all i we have τBi . |Bi|. The adding of dummy friends
could be done in such a way that the dummies are selected uniformly at random
from the set U and added to the set S. These dummy friends would not receive
the “real” key, but a random string of bits.
However, this approach suffers from various caveats: first off, dummies would
neither communicate nor participate in the discussion and the adversary could
use this information to her advantage. Secondly, dummy identities should not
and would not be able to access the contents, but this leads to the situation
where those recipients selected as dummies would know that they are in fact
dummies. In this case, the recipient privacy can only be assured for outsiders
and not insiders. Care is needed to resolve these issues and support the use of
dummy tweaks in a proper way. In addition, the task of the adversary would now
be to distinguish real recipients from dummy ones, or if there are any dummy
recipients in a given set of recipients.
Statistics show that an average OSN user on, e.g., Facebook, has 350 friends.3
Furthermore, some statistics show that the average recipient set of group mes-
sages to be about 15 people. We remark, however, that the dynamic character
of these networks causes the sets of recipients to vary over time, and this may
influence the amount of frientropy and the level of privacy.
6 Membership Query Security
As noted earlier, the previous versions of recipient privacy do not take into
account the nature of communications between possible recipients, and especially
in the OSN setting this leads to diminishing privacy for the recipients. We will
next present a stronger form of recipient privacy. It allows for the adversary
to make also membership queries on the set of recipients in addition to the
traditional decryption queries. A membership query tests whether a given u is
in the set S used to encrypt the message.
One might think that this type of adversary is unrealistic and too powerful
even in the OSN setting. However, as an example, think about a sysadmin on
some content distribution system. In a well-maintained and -operated system, the
sysadmin would probably have access to all kinds of logs and system information
of even individual machines (of certain users). Thus, the sysadmin could a)
know who has downloaded the content, and b) infer (through timing, power
3 http://www.statista.com/statistics/232499/americans-who-use-social-
networking-sites-several-times-per-day (read 2016-06-13)
consumption, or some other form of side-channel/social engineering) whether or
not some of these people were able to correctly decrypt the content. In this sense,
the power of such queries is not an unrealistic assumption for adversaries both
in OSNs and in the original scenarios of recipient privacy.
Definition 6 (Membership Query Security). Let n ≥ 1, and let Bn ⊆ P(U)
be a set of subsets of U of size n. Let X be a probability distribution. The set
provided membership query security if a PPT adversary A wins the following
game with the challenger Ch, only with negligible probability:
Init: Ch chooses a set S X←− Bn.
Phase 1: A adaptively issues κ membership queries. A single membership query
M(u) reveals if u ∈ S, i.e., M(u) = true iff u ∈ S and false otherwise.
Denote by Q the set of all users u for which A issues a query M(u), and by
R the set {u ∈ Q : M(u) = true}.
Guess: A outputs a guess S ′ ∈ Bn.
The adversary wins if S ′ = S, and we define AdvMemQA = Pr[S = S ′].
It is clear to see that membership query security is closely related to frientropy.
Proposition 3. Let κ, n ≥ 1. Consider any B ⊆ P(U) consisting of subsets of U
of size n. Assume that B has κ-frientropy Φ. Let X be the uniform distribution.
For any adversary A making κ membership queries, we have AdvMemQA ≤ 2−Φκ .
Proof. Note that any set of κ membership queries reveals a set of at most κ
revealed users, as in the worst case all queries yield true. Denote these κ users
by R. The goal of the adversary A now is to guess S ∈ Bn given that R ⊆ S.
Its success probability is, by definition, at most 2−Φκ . uunionsq
A more strict version would have the adversary guess for a single user u ∈ S \R
and restrict that R ⊂ S is a proper subset. It is easy to see that the notion
of privacy against this adversary is stronger than that of the above game. The
second way to amend the game would be to take into account the existence of
dummy friends. The challenger would choose two sets S and D with D ⊂ S,
where D represents the chosen dummies (if any). This would mean that the
adversary would also output two sets S ′ and D′ as guesses, with |S ′| = |S| and
D′ ⊂ S ′, where D′ is the adversary’s guess for the dummies. In this game we can
also model weak and strong membership queries, where the weak one is as in the
above game and the strong gives the adversary also the information whether or
not u ∈ D, if u ∈ S. The analysis of these variations is out of the scope of this
paper and a possible venue for future research.
7 Conclusion
The traditional recipient privacy definitions fall short in providing provable se-
curity in OSN settings. The issue can be salvaged by requiring a high enough
“frientropy,” meaning that if one of the recipients gets disclosed, the other re-
cipients (its “friends”) remain mostly anonymous. Admittedly, sets of recipients
are in practice not random; if a user u appears in only a few social groups, and
it reveals itself as being a receiver of a message, the remaining set of recipients,
conditioned on the fact that u appears in this group, has a very low entropy,
and a way to resolve this is by using dummy friends.
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